Home

The debate over what role Israel should play in American foreign policy stretches back to before the Jewish state's founding and has hardly been constant, scholar Joel Migdal said at Rutgers University on April 14.

At a lecture sponsored by the Allen and Joan Bildner Center for the Study of Jewish Life at Rutgers University, Migdal, the Robert F. Philip Professor of International Studies at University of Washington, spoke about the rise and fall of the ''strategic relationship'' between the two countries.

The Middle East, Migdal explained, has been at the ''epicenter'' of American foreign policy since World War II not only because of its oil but also because the region houses several important international trade routes.

Yet, for the United States, he said, the region has been ''explosive, difficult to control, complex, and changing.''

In order to advance its own interests in the region, the United States has sought ''strategic partners,'' or countries that could help America achieve its goals in ways that it could not acting alone. Initially after the war, the popular choices for such partnerships were Iran and Saudi Arabia, and later Egypt. But, Migdal said, these countries were often reluctant to play the role America wanted.

''It's not surprising, given the options, that the question of Israel as a strategic partner arose,'' he said.

That question, in fact, arose even before Israel's founding when President Harry Truman gathered his senior staff to discuss whether the United States should recognize Israel should it declare statehood, and the answer was yes, what should this future state's relationship with America be.

Midgal recounted the meeting where Clark Clifford, serving as White House Counsel at the time, argued that Israel should be recognized as well as regarded as an important strategic ally.

Everyone else at that meeting, including a vocal Secretary of State George Marshall, took the opposite position, arguing that siding with Israel would inflame Arabs, and given their sheer disproportionate numbers compared to Jews, would hurt American interests in the region.

Though Truman sided with Clifford in that debate, for the next 20 years Marshall's vision dominated American foreign policy and the ''United States held Israel at arm's length,'' Migdal said.

That changed, he said, with the Black September War in 1970.

After several failed attempts by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to assassinate King Hussein of Jordan, on Sept. 7, 1970, the Palestinian militant group hijacked three planes and blew them up in front of TV cameras after removing the hostages.

Hussein, viewing this attack as provocation against his rule, decided to strike the PLO. However, the Palestinian group, as Migdal noted, was supported by Syria and Iraq, and therefore allied with the Soviet Union.

After a convoy of Syrian tanks amassed at the Jordanian border, Hussein panicked and sent a telegram to the U.S. pleading for military support.

The U.S., bogged down in Vietnam, did not want to get involved in another conflict and, according to Migdal, feared that its participation would trigger a larger crisis with the Soviet Union.

Consequently, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger phoned Yitzhak Rabin, then serving as ambassador to the United States, and suggested that Israel engage itself in the conflict and destroy the Syrian forces.

Hussein rejected Israeli assistance, saying this would be even worse than a Syrian invasion. Israel then moved its troops to the intersection of Israel, Jordan, and Syria, Migdal explained, and without a single bullet being fired the Syrians retreated.

That response was seen as a victory for the United States and was the beginning of the strategic relationship between the two countries. That relationship, Migdal emphasized, is different from what is often called the countries' ''special relationship,'' which is based on ''softer factors'' like shared values, the societies' commitment to democracy, and their pioneer origins.

The irony, Migdal said, is that American presidents who treasured the ''special relationship'' most -- such as Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush -- were the ones who regarded the strategic relationship least.

''Nixon, who established the strategic partnership, had little affection for Israel,'' he noted.

For the past two decades, this strategic relationship has largely been erased, Migdal suggested. This change, he said, can be most vividly seen in the role, or lack of one, that Israel played in the First Gulf War during the early 90s.

After the United States decided that Iraq's invasion of Kuwait threatened American interests (hardly a foregone conclusion as the Soviet Union and the Cold War approached its last breath), Secretary of State James Baker assembled a coalition of 34 countries -- plus additional financial support from Japan and Germany -- to oppose the Iraqi incursion.

Israel volunteered to join the coalition, but the U.S. refused to let them participate, out of concern that Israel's involvement would undermine the support of major Arab powers who came onboard to fight against another Arab state, according to Migdal.

''Israeli leaders realized that Israel was transformed overnight from a strategic asset to a strategic liability,'' he said.

Despite Israel's decreasing strategic importance for the United States since the end of the Cold War, Migdal said that the recent rise of Iran provides an opportunity for Israel to reestablish its past relationship with America.

As the balance of power in the Muslim world has shift over the past several decades from the Sunni, Arab states like Egypt and Saudi Arabia to Shiite, non Arab ones like Iran and Turkey, Migdal argued that the possibility exists for Israel to join a coalition with the former to oppose Iran's growing dominance.

This potential alliance, Migdal said, can be seen in the initial reaction by Arab states to Israel's war with Hamas in late 2008 and early 2009.

Before the photographs of dead Palestinian children began to dominate the Arab press, Migdal described how many people in these countries -- while not exactly cheering on Israel -- blamed Hamas for bringing the attack upon themselves after firing rockets into southern Israel.

A defeat of Hamas would be seen as defeat of Iran by many in the Arab world, according to Migdal, and would deter the Islamic Republic from attempting to amass more power in the region.

However, before any serious military cooperation between Arab states and Israel can be carried out, a peace agreement must be reached, Migdal concluded.